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(such as exercising or quitting smoking) in order to attract a
spouse.

Chapter 1

Medicaid and the Labor Supply of Single
Health plays an important role in labor markets for several Mothers: Implications for Health Care Reform

reasons. First, physical health is a component of human
capital. Better health leads to more available time for labor
market activity, but better health may also increase wages,
as healthier individuals are more productive. On the other
hand, labor market activity affects health. Besides the direct
effect of working, for example, in an adverse environment,
institutional factors also play a role. In particular, private
health insurance in the United States is tied to employment.
Therefore, individuals have an incentive to work for an
employer that provides them with health benefits, although
they may be a better match with another employer that does
not provide health insurance.
The relationship between labor supply and public health
insurance is less obvious but nevertheless important. Since
Medicaid eligibility depends on income, individuals have an
incentive to decrease their labor supply in order to qualify
for this public health insurance benefit. This effect matters
especially for individuals who do not receive private health
insurance through their employers. Since jobs with higher
wages are more likely to provide health benefits, there is
a range in the middle of the earnings distribution where
individuals earn too much to be eligible for Medicaid, but do
not receive employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). In
this setting, the recent U.S. health care reform, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), has significant potential effects on labor supply. Both the expansion of
Medicaid eligibility thresholds and the introduction of health
insurance subsidies serve to fill the gap that currently exists
between Medicaid and ESHI. The changes enacted by this
reform imply that individuals can choose their labor supply
without necessarily considering if they can obtain public or
private health insurance. This can potentially lead to higher
earnings and increased productivity. If individuals do not
have to work full time in order to obtain ESHI, however, this
reform may also decrease labor supply. In the first two chapters of my dissertation, I analyze the effect of the PPACA on
the labor supply of a group that can particularly benefit from
this reform—single mothers.
Health plays an important role not only in the labor market but also in the marriage market. As in the labor market,
the relationship between health and individual behavior is
complex. For example, being married may improve one’s
health because of financial and emotional support. On the
other hand, being healthy may improve one’s prospects on
the marriage market. In the third chapter of my dissertation, I
focus on the latter effect and study whether individuals invest
in their health by improving their health-related behavior
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The PPACA has the potential to significantly affect
employment among the low-wage population. On the one
hand, increased Medicaid eligibility and newly established
health insurance subsidies will reduce the incentive to seek
health insurance through employment. On the other hand,
expanding the income cutoffs for eligibility will remove
work disincentives for individuals who currently refrain from
working because they are afraid to lose Medicaid eligibility.
The effects of this law on work incentives for those marginally attached to the workforce are therefore ambiguous. At
the same time, this population is important to policymakers
because of its vulnerability and relative deprivation.
In this chapter, I aim to determine the work incentive
effects of the PPACA provisions that apply specifically to
single mothers, a group that is characterized by low attachment to the labor force and that will be particularly affected
by these reforms. Single mothers and their children are also
the main beneficiaries of Medicaid. In contrast to married
women, they do not have the option to obtain health insurance coverage through the employers of their spouses.
Moreover, they often lack the qualifications necessary to find
a job with ESHI.
I estimate a structural model of labor supply that incorporates Medicaid and ESHI. In estimating the model, I rely
on exogenous variation from recent expansions in Medicaid eligibility. After obtaining estimates of the preference
parameters governing employment choice, I use them to
simulate single mothers’ labor supply and take-up of ESHI
under health care reform. The structural approach allows me
to analyze the effects of health insurance subsidies, a policy
that has not yet been introduced at the national level.
My contributions in this chapter are fourfold. First, I
model and estimate the joint impact of Medicaid and ESHI
on single mothers’ labor supply. Potential ESHI coverage can
affect the direction of the effect of Medicaid on employment.
On the one hand, many low-income individuals are not qualified enough for jobs that provide health benefits. Moreover,
they are only eligible for Medicaid if their incomes fall
below the applicable threshold. This induces work disincentives. Expanding Medicaid eligibility or introducing health
insurance subsidies would therefore relax this constraint and
potentially increase labor supply. On the other hand, if the
income threshold increases sufficiently, full-time workers
with ESHI coverage may become eligible for Medicaid or
subsidies. Since Medicaid and subsidized health insurance
are cheaper and may be more generous than ESHI, these
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workers may drop ESHI coverage (crowding-out of ESHI)
and potentially reduce their labor supply.
Second, I distinguish between full-time and part-time
employment. The literature typically considers only the
participation decision. As argued above, workers with low
initial labor supply might increase their labor supply when
the Medicaid eligibility threshold increases. Others might
work full-time prior to health care reform in order to qualify
for ESHI coverage. Introducing health insurance subsidies
allows these individuals to reduce their labor supply and
drop ESHI coverage while obtaining subsidized health insurance. Therefore, not allowing for an intensive margin would
mask these changes in labor supply.
Third, I allow individual differences in the valuation of
health insurance to affect the labor supply effects of Medicaid expansions. When analyzing the effects of Medicaid
expansions on labor supply, it is important to account for
individuals’ valuation of health insurance, which in turn
depends on their health status. For example, a healthy person
might change her behavior less in response to Medicaid
expansions than someone with chronic medical conditions
that require expensive health care. Specifically, I allow for
health-related heterogeneity in medical expenditure and
preferences over health insurance coverage.
Fourth, the exogenous variation used to identify the
impact of Medicaid expansions on labor supply comes from
changes in Medicaid policies after the 1996 welfare reforms.
These reforms affected mostly parents instead of children
who benefited from earlier expansions. Since the recent
health care reform extends Medicaid eligibility to even
broader groups, the analysis of the more current Medicaid
expansions is of particular policy interest. Moreover, some
states implemented Medicaid thresholds that are close to the
one specified by PPACA, which allows for more realistic
policy simulations.
I specify a discrete static labor supply model. Single
mothers maximize their utility, which is derived from consumption, leisure, and own and children’s health insurance
coverage subject to a budget constraint that incorporates
out-of-pocket medical expenditure and government transfers.
The possible choices are nonwork, part-time without ESHI,
full-time work without ESHI, and full-time work with ESHI.
Depending on earnings and state- and year-specific Medicaid
thresholds, single mothers and their children are eligible for
Medicaid.
To estimate the choice model, I develop a two-stage estimator. In the first stage, I estimate a wage equation and two
medical expenditure equations for mothers and children. The
goal is to obtain conditional distributions of the utility function arguments. The wage regression accounts for selection
into the labor force and into jobs with or without ESHI using
a bivariate selection correction mechanism. Both the wage
and medical expenditure regressions are estimated allowing
for random individual effects, thus taking advantage of the
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panel structure in my data. In the second stage, I estimate
the parameters of the utility function using draws from the
conditional distributions of earnings and medical expenditures as regressors. I allow both observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in the utility parameters. The unobserved
heterogeneity is modeled as a multivariate normal distribution. Hence, I use a multinomial logit model with choice
probabilities that are integrated over the normal distribution.
To estimate the parameters of this distribution and the fixed
preference parameters, I use maximum simulated likelihood.
Standard errors are block-bootstrapped over the two stages of
the estimator.
Individual data come from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) from 1996 to 2008. The MEPS is the ideal
data set for the question at hand since it combines detailed
information in health insurance coverage and medical expenditures with labor market variables. The medical expenditure
data are very reliable since individuals’ responses have been
cross-checked with medical providers. Moreover, the MEPS
provides a panel, albeit a short one, so I can account for individual effects in my two-stage estimator. I use a restricted
version of the MEPS, which allows me to match individual
data with state- and year-specific policy variables such as
Medicaid thresholds and welfare rules.
The estimated preference parameters indicate that single
mothers with medical conditions are significantly more likely
not to work in order to be eligible for Medicaid or to work
full-time with ESHI. This result implies that women who
need health insurance most avoid the gap between Medicaid
and ESHI where they would be uninsured. It is likely that
these women would otherwise choose a different location on
the hours distribution to increase their productivity or have
more time for leisure or child care. Hence, these women
benefit particularly from PPACA since it allows them to enter
the labor force and to work in jobs without ESHI coverage.
Based on these estimates, I simulate single mothers’
labor supply choices. First, I check the results by simulating
labor supply under current Medicaid rules. The simulated
choice probabilities match the observed ones closely, thereby
providing evidence that the model is valid. Then I simulate
labor supply under two policy counterfactuals: expansion of
Medicaid only and both expansion of Medicaid and introduction of health insurance subsidies. While the PPACA
corresponds to the latter simulation, it is important to analyze
how the components of this reform affect labor supply
decisions independently. The simulation results show that
health care reform increases labor force participation among
single mothers by about 6 percent. Moreover, labor supply
at the intensive margin grows by about 5 percent. Finally,
health care reform leads to crowding-out of ESHI of about
40 percent in this population. These results are heterogeneous across subgroups, however, with single mothers with
medical conditions reacting most strongly to the reform, as
expected based on the preference parameter estimates. I also
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use these simulations to estimate the welfare implications of
this reform. In particular, I calculate the compensating variation of this reform, that is, the dollar amount a single mother
would be willing to forgo in order to obtain the reform. On
average, this amount is about three times larger than the perfamily increase in public expenditures, where the increase
comes mostly from the new health insurance subsidies.
Hence, I conclude that this reform is welfare improving.

Chapter 2
The Effect of Recent Medicaid Expansions on
the Labor Supply of Single Mothers
One drawback of the structural approach in the first chapter is the functional and distributional assumptions necessary
to estimate policy-invariant preference parameters. They are
needed to simulate labor supply under a reform that is not yet
observed, but it is difficult to test directly if these assumptions are valid. To check the robustness of my simulation
results in Chapter 1, I perform reduced-form regressions of
single mothers’ labor supply on Medicaid eligibility. Exogenous variation comes again from recent expansions in Medicaid thresholds for parents. Instead of estimating the effect
of the PPACA, which would require more structure, I simply
estimate the effect of existing Medicaid reforms. I can then
compare these estimation results to the policy counterfactual
I perform in Chapter 1 that only includes Medicaid expansions but no health insurance subsidies. Besides providing
a robustness check for the results in Chapter 1, this chapter
is also of broader interest in its own right. No study exists
to date that analyzes the overall effect of recent Medicaid
expansions on labor supply, and this chapter fills this gap in
the literature.
Since Medicaid eligibility depends on earnings, which in
turn are determined by labor supply, simply regressing labor
supply on Medicaid coverage or eligibility yields inconsistent estimates due to endogeneity of the Medicaid eligibility
variable. In order to avoid this problem, I use two different
identification strategies. First, I use Medicaid and Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) income eligibility thresholds as instruments for Medicaid and CHIP coverage. To the
extent that these thresholds are exogenous, they are valid
instruments. As with all public policies, there is a concern
that policymakers choose Medicaid thresholds in response to
individual behavior, rendering these thresholds endogenous.
In this case, however, it is plausible that policymakers do not
react to single mothers’ labor supply when choosing Medicaid thresholds. Medicaid is a program intended to provide
health insurance coverage to low-income families, but not as
a labor market program.
Second, I use a triple-differences strategy by comparing labor market outcomes across states, over time, and
between single mothers and childless single women. This
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identification strategy does not require exogeneity of
Medicaid thresholds with respect to single women’s labor
supply. Hence, it is valid even if the exogeneity assumption
described above fails. Instead, it relies on the assumption that
variation in labor supply across single mothers and childless
single women is independent of Medicaid thresholds when
controlling for state and year fixed effects. Childless single
women constitute an ideal control group since they face a
similar labor market environment as single mothers, but they
are never eligible for Medicaid. Under current policies, only
parents of Medicaid-eligible children qualify for this benefit.
Since Medicaid coverage is identically equal to zero for
childless women, I cannot use it as the explanatory variable.
Instead, I simulate Medicaid eligibility by state, year, and
demographic group, and use this simulated measure interacted with an indicator for the presence of children as the
regressor of interest.
A second contribution of this chapter is the analysis of
migration patterns between states in response to changes
in Medicaid thresholds. An important concern when using
cross-state variation in policies is potential migration in
response to these policies. If single mothers select their
location based on Medicaid generosity, for example, the
identifying assumption that Medicaid eligibility thresholds
are exogenous would be invalid. To test if migration because
of differences in Medicaid generosity is a problem in this
context, I compare year-to-year changes in Medicaid thresholds of single mothers and childless single women who did
or did not migrate between states. Again, childless women
are an ideal comparison group since they are never eligible
for Medicaid and therefore have no incentive to migrate
because of differences between these policies. Otherwise,
the incentives for single women with and without children to
move between states should be similar because of cross-state
differences in labor markets. Therefore, we expect to see no
systematic difference in migration patterns between these
two groups in response to Medicaid threshold changes.
Using a large sample of single women with and without
children from the March CPS from 1996 to 2007, I first
provide extensive descriptive evidence on the effect of
Medicaid expansions on single mothers’ labor supply. This
mostly graphical suggests that single mothers adjust their
labor supply in response to the incentives that are implied by
Medicaid income tests. Overall, expanded Medicaid thresholds have a negative effect on labor supply. This adjustment
mostly occurs at the extensive margin, but to some extent
single mothers also reduce hours worked in order to qualify
for Medicaid.
In the main estimation results both identification strategies
yield the same result that expansions in Medicaid eligibility do not decrease labor supply. I use various measures of
labor supply for both the extensive and intensive margins,
including labor force participation, full-time versus part-time
work, weeks worked per year, and hours worked per week.
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The results for all outcomes are consistent in showing that
an increase in Medicaid eligibility thresholds does not have a
negative effect on labor supply.
To test if single mothers migrate between states in order
to benefit from more generous Medicaid policies, I use CPS
data on the state of residence in the previous year. This
allows me to compare migration of single women with and
without children in a difference-in-differences framework
when the destination state has a different Medicaid threshold from the initial state. There is no systematic difference
between these groups when comparing the unconditional
distributions of differences in Medicaid thresholds pre- and
postmigration. Hence, I conclude that single mothers do not
choose their locations based on Medicaid thresholds.
In summary, this chapter provides evidence that the
structural assumptions in Chapter 1 are valid since I obtain
qualitatively similar results. Medicaid expansions alone have
moderately negative effects on single mothers’ labor supply.
This result is of interest to policymakers since it shows that
the health insurance subsidies in PPACA are necessary to
avoid decreases in labor supply in this population. Moreover, I show that migration in response to Medicaid thresholds does not bias the estimation results. This conclusion is
important since it backs an important assumption when using
policy variation across states. It also shows that Medicaid
policies do not impact individual behavior enough to cause
location changes.

Chapter 3
The Marriage Market Ratio and Investment
in Health
Health also plays an important role in the marriage market: healthy individuals may be more likely to get married
or find a more desirable spouse. Therefore, individuals can
affect their marriage market outcomes by improving their
health. This is the topic of the third chapter: I test whether
individuals invest more in their health when it is harder to
find a spouse. Sociologists and researchers in public health
have long recognized the relationship between marriage and
health. The correlation between marital status and health is
often given a causal interpretation termed marital protection.
However, most existing studies merely uncover a correlation
between marital status and good health or lower mortality.
Causal effects are difficult to determine because individuals select into marriage. The effect of marriage on health
decreases when marital selection is accounted for, but the
positive correlation persists. Therefore, the consensus is that
both selection and a causal protective effect of marriage on
health matter.
If being married improves one’s health and people sort
into marriage based on their premarital health status, an
interesting question arises: To what extent do people decide
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to improve their health in order to attract a potential spouse
and to increase the likelihood of marriage? The third chapter
attempts to answer this question. Depending on the result,
this has important implications for the findings of the existing literature claiming the presence of a causal protective
effect of marriage on health. If individuals improve their
health in order to get married, any positive correlation
between marital status and health is confounded by preexisting health status. This effect is not necessarily the same as
marital selection because the decision to be healthy is made
consciously to attract a potential spouse.
To formalize the relationship between marriage market
conditions and health investment, I develop a simple model
of premarital health behaviors. Intuitively, the incentive to
invest in one’s health in order to attract a potential spouse is
highest when it is not certain to find a spouse, but the probability is sufficiently high. Once it becomes very unlikely to
find a spouse, the cost of investing in one’s health outweighs
the (uncertain) benefit of marriage. On the other hand, when
marriage is certain, the incentive for health investments
is smaller because it is more likely to find a spouse in any
case. The likelihood to become married, in turn, depends on
the relative numbers of men and women. Hence, the model
predicts that the relationship between the relative numbers of
individuals of own and opposite sexes and healthy behavior
has an inverted U-shape.
A simple way to capture relative numbers of men and
women on the marriage market is to use sex ratios, which are
defined by the ratio of men to women at marriageable ages.
Instead of simply using the ratio of cohort sizes, I develop a
marriage market ratio that explicitly accounts for the empirical distribution of age differences between married men
and women. A novel contribution is to distinguish between
different racial compositions of couples. For example, the
distribution of age differences among mixed-race couples
exhibits a larger variance than that of same-race couples.
My marriage market ratio accounts for these differences and
therefore correctly reflects the marriage market conditions of
black women, for example, who have the option to marry a
black or a white man of different ages.
Using data from the National Health Interview Survey and
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, I test the
hypothesis that the marriage market ratio affects the healthrelated behaviors of smoking, drinking, and exercising. The
results indicate that men and women of all races are less
likely to smoke and black men and women are less likely to
drink when facing unfavorable marriage market conditions.
The results for physical activity, however, are mixed.
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